Terry R. Spencer, Et Al., Plaintiffs/Appellants vs. Stephen M. Glover, Et Al., Defendants/Appellees by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2016 
Terry R. Spencer, Et Al., Plaintiffs/Appellants vs. Stephen M. 
Glover, Et Al., Defendants/Appellees 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellee, Spencer et al v Glover, No. 20150892 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3441 
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TERRY R. SPENCER, et al. , 
Plaintiffa/Appel lants, 
V. 
STEPHEN M GLOVER, 
Defendant/Appel lee. 
---0000000---
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Appellate Case No. 201 50892-CA 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Spencer, et al. , v. Glover, Case No. 
150903279, Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, Presiding 
GA VIND . COLLIER 
TERRY R . SPENCER, Ph.D. 
TR Spencer & Associates, P .C. 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ROBERT B. CUMMINGS (SBN 13 186) 
THE SALT LAKE LA WYER S 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622 
Salt Lake City, UT 84 11 1 
Telephone: (801) 590-7555 
Facsimile: (801) 384-0825 
E-mail : rol5crt@thesalt!akela1vyc1·s.com 
Allorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN~ 8 2016 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TERRY R. SPENCER, et al., 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants, 
V. 
STEPHEN M. GLOVER, 
Defendant/ Appel lee. 
---0000000---
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Appellate Case No. 20150892-CA 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~--------. ·-----·-----------
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, Spencer, et al., v. Glover, Case No. 
150903279, Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, Presiding 
GA VIN G. COLLIER 
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D. 
TR Spencer & Associates, P. C. 
140 Wesl 9000 South, Suite 9 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorneys for Plaint(DlAppella11t 
ROBERT B. CUMMINGS (SBN 13186) 
THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 590-7555 
Facsimile: (80 l) 384-0825 
E-mail: robcrl(aHhesa It lukclmvycrs.com 
Attorneys.for Defendant/Appellee 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l), the Plaintiffs/Appel1ants to this appeal are 
Terry R. Spencer and TR Spencer & Associates, P.C. Defendant/Appellee is Stephen M. 
Glover. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SECTION 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
OF Tl IIS APPEAL 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
I I. 
General Law Applicable To Defamation And The First Amendment 
Judge Hogan Was Correct In Finding The Yelp.com Review Is Mere 
Opinion And Not Defamatory 
PAGE 
n/a 
111 
6 
6 
8 
14 
15 
15 
16 
A. The Common Usage Of The Words In The Yelp.com Review Is 18 
To Express Opinion 
B. The Potentially Objectionable Statements Are Not Capable Of 
Being Objectively Verified 
20 
C. The Full Yelp.com Review Shows That It Was Mere Opinion 22 
D. The Broader Setting Of The Review Published On Yelp.com 24 
Shows The Comment Is Mere Opinion 
Ill. The Intentional Infliclion or Emotional Distress Claim Fails 
Because The Yelp.com Review Was Not Defamatory And 
Otherwise Does Not Rise To The Level Of Extreme Or Outrageous 
Conduct 
26 
IV. The Intentional Interference With Economic Relations Claim Fails 27 
Because Mr. Glover's Yelp.com Review Does Not Amount To 
V. 
Improper Means 
Judge Hogan Properly Treated Mr. Glover's Motion As A Motion 
To Dismiss 
VI. Request To Seal Portions Of Record On Appeal 
28 
30 
CONCLUSION 31 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l l) STATEMENT 32 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. APP. P. 32 
24(f)( 1 )(A) 
ADDENDUM nk 
11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 194 P.3d 903 
Alvarado v. KOBTV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & lvfcDonough, 2003 UT 9, 70 P.3d 17 
Brumpton Bldg, LLC, 2013 IL App ( JS') 12054 7-U, 2013 WL 416185 (Ill. 
App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2013) 
Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) 
Cuny v. Yelp inc., Case No. 14-cv-03547-JST, 2015 WL 1849037 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 21, 2015) 
Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 3 89, 265 P .3d 139 
Dennet v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983 (Utah 1968) 
Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, 345 P .3d 553 
G FF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F .3d 1381 ( I 0th Cir. 
1997) 
Hogan v. Winder, No. 2: 12-cv-123 TS, 2012 WL 4356326 (D. Utah Sept. 
24, 2012), aff'd, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014) 
Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014) 
Loftus v. Nazari, 21 F.Supp.3d 849 (E.D. Ky. 2014) 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. I ( 1990) 
Oakwood Village. LLC v. A lbertsons, Inc., 2004 UT IO 1, I 04 P .3d 1226 
Seal v. Young, No. 2: 10-cv-790 TS, 2012 WL 177544 (D. Utah Jan. 20, 
2012) 
Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2013) 
Simler v. Chile/, 2016 UT 23, -- P.3d --, 2016 WL 3101845 
St. Benedict's Devel. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 81 I P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 
Webster v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, 290 P .3d 930 
West v. Thomson New,\papers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) 
Westmont Maintenance Co,p. v. Vance, 2013 UT App 236,313 P.3d 1149 
RULES AND STATUTES 
UTAH R. APP. P. 3 
UTAH R. APP. P. 21 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24 
111 
PAGE 
5,28 
30 
3-4, 27 
19, 23 
3 
10 
30 
15, 17 
27 
30 
Passim 
13 
25,27 
16 
4-5, 28-
29, 30 
21 
15-16, 
20,22 
3 
4 
2 
Passim 
2,3,4 
PAGE 
31 
31 
UTAJT R. Clv. P. I 2(b) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3- I 02 
UT AH CODE ANN. § 78A-4- l 03 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-11-108 
UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-202.02 
UTAH. R. PROF'L C. 1.16 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const. art. I, § l 
Utah Const. art. I, § 15 
United States Const. amendment I 
OTHER SOURCES 
The Advocate, Official Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Vo. 52 No. 1, 
Jan. 2009 (available at 
http:/ /isb. idaho. gov/pd f /advocatc/issucs/adv09jan.pd f 
iv 
4, 6, 11, 
30 
I 
. I 
11 
31 
21 
PAGE 
6 
6 
6 
PAGE 
21 
~ 
~ 
STATEMENT OF .JURISDICTION 
On September 28, 2015, Judge Hogan entered a ruling and order dismissing all of 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants Terry R. Spencer and TR Spencer and Associates, P.C. 's 
( collectively, "Spencer") claims and ordered the parties to arbitrate Spencer's breach of 
contract claim. (R004 I 7-00426.) As to the latter, Judge Hogan dismissed the breach of 
contract claim without prejudice. (R00426.) Therefore, Judge Hogan's order resolved all 
of Spencer's claims and is thus a final order appealablc pursuant to UTAH R. Arr. P. 3(a). 
Original appellate jurisdiction vested with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. * 78A-3-l 02(3)(j). (See R00448-00449.) On October 28, 2015, the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78/\-3-102( 4 ), transferred jurisdiction 
over this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. (R0045 l-00452.) 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(5)(A) and (b)( 1 ), Mr. Glover herein 
incorporates Spencer's citations to where the issues below were preserved in the record in 
the trial court, unless othe1wise noted. (App. Br. at l-3.) Spencer provided three issues 
1 Spencer cites UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(h) as the conferring statute vesting this 
Court with original appellate jurisdiction. That code section, however, only applies to 
"appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases~ including, but not limited 
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visilalion, 
adoption, and paternity[.]" 
on appeal, but Mr. Glover disputes Spencer's characterization of the issues. Furthermore, 
while Spencer docs not raise on appeal Judge Hogan's decision to not consider the 
affidavits submitted by Spencer in support of their opposition to Mr. Glover's Motion to 
Dismiss, Spencer has referenced Judge Hogan's decision on that issue. Therefore, while 
Mr. Glover reserves the right to assert that Spencer has not properly preserved the issue 
for appeal by not clearly raising it in their opening brief, Mr. Glover is addressing the 
issue out of an abundance of caution. 
ISSUE #1: Did Judge Hogan err in granting Mr. Glover's Motion to Dismiss 
Spencer's defamation claim finding that the comment was protectable opinion based 
upon: (i) the objectionable words, including "hunt-and-peck", "b.s.", "yelled', and 
"worst ever" in the Yelp.com review conveying subjeclive beliefs; (ii) these phrases 
conveying subjective belief thereby making it not possible to objectively verify whether 
the statements arc true or false; (iii) the context of the Y clp.com review showing that the 
statements were made by a biased, and therefore potentially unreliable, individual; and 
(iv) the context of the review, being on Yelp.com, suggesting that the statements in the 
comment arc opinion? 
STANDARD OF REVIE\V: The Utah Court of Appeals "review[s] a district 
court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for correctness." Westmont Nfaintenance Corp. v. 
Vance, 2013 UT App 236, ii I 0, 313 P.3d 1149 (citing Webster v. JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, NA, 2012 UT App 321, ii 2,290 P.3d 930) (reviewing grant of motion to dismiss 
2 
defamation claim on judicial proceedings privilege grounds). "When reviewing the 
propriety of granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, [the Court of Appeals] accept[s] as true all material allegations contained 
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah I 994) (cilations omitted) (applying standard to 
defamation claim on motion to dismiss). Furthermore, "' [ w ]hether a statement is capable 
of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question or law.'" Id. at I 008. '"Only if a court 
first determines that a publication might be considered defamatory by a reasonable person 
is there a fact issue for the trier of fact." Cox v. Hatch, 76 l P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). 
Like this Court's review of a motion to dismiss, this Court reviews questions oflaw for 
correctness. Simler v. Chile/, 2016 UT 23, ii 9, -- P.3d--, 2016 WL 3101845 (citations 
omitted). 
ISSUE #2: Did Judge Hogan err in dismissing Spencer's intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim finding that the online Y clp.com review was neither defamatory 
nor did it amount to outrageous or intolerable behavior, and Spencer pled no other facts 
to suggest objectionable behavior by Mr. Glover? 
STANDARD OF REVIE\V: The Utah Court of Appeals reviews the grant of a 
motion to dismiss for correctness, accepting as true all material allegations contained in 
the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Vance, 2013 UT App 236, 
ii l O; West, 872 P.2d at l 003. See also Bennett v . .Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
3 
McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 158, 70 P.3d 17 (setting forth standard to state a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
ISSUE #3: Did Judge Hogan err in dismissing Spencer's claim for intentional 
inference with economic relations based upon Spencer's failure to plead facts supporting 
that Mr. Glover's conduct amounted to "improper means," especially considering that the 
Yelp.com review is protcctable opinion and not defamatory? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Court of Appeals reviews the grant of a 
motion to dismiss for correctness, accepting as true all material allegations contained in 
the complaint and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Vance, 2013 UT App 236, 
1 ) 0; West, 872 P.2d at I 003. See also St. Benedict's Devel. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
8 J I P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991) (setting forth standard to state a claim for intentional 
interference with economic relations). 
ISSUE #4: Did Judge Hogan err in not considering the affidavits submitted by 
Spencer, the submission of which was in violation of UTAH R. crv. P. 12(6), and 
otherwise not converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to UT AHR. Crv. P. 12(b )? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "If a court does not exclude material outside the 
pleadings and fails to convert a rule 12(6)(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is 
reversible error unless the dismissal can be justified without considering the outside 
documents." Oakwood Village, LLC v. A lhertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ii 12, I 04 P .3d 
4 
1226 (citation omitted). There are two exceptions, however. "First, if ·a plaintiff docs 
not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the document is 
referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim, a defendant may submit 
an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss."' Id. 
at 1 13 ( citalion omitted). Second, "the submission of documents outside the pleadings 
by itscl f is not a basis for conversion to summary judgment; to effect a rule I 2(b) 
conversion, the court must have relied on those documents for its decision." Id. at ii 14 
( citation omitted). 2 
PRESERVED IN THE RECORD BELOW: The issue as to whether Judge 
Hogan should convert Mr. Glover's Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment was raised at R00342-00343, and refuted by Mr. Glover at R00395, R00399-
00400. Spencer, however, did not directly raise the issue in their opening brief. 
Therefore, the issue should not be addressed by this Court. See, e.g., Alle,t v. Friel, 2008 
UT 56, ~I 8, 194 P.3d 903 ("It is well settled that 'issues raised by an appellant in the 
reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief arc considered waived and will 
not be considered by the appellate court."' (citation omitted)). 
2 Spencer did not raise this as an issue in the opening brief. Spencer, hO\vever, referenced 
Judge Hogan's decision to not review the affidavits submitted by Spencer in suppoti of 
Spencer's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, Mr. Glover has addressed 
that issue here, although not necessarily properly raised or preserved by Spencer. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF 
THIS APPEAL 
Mr. Glover believes that only the proper application of UTAH R. CIV. P. l 2(b) in 
relation to Spencer's dismissed claims is at issue and determinative of this appeal. 
Additionally, however, United States Constitution, amendment I and Utah State 
Constitution, article I, sections 1 and 15 are at play regarding the protections provided by 
those constitutional provisions to opinion as protectable speech. 
ST A TEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves an attorney attempting to strong-arm his former client into 
removing an unflattering review from Y clp.com. Spencer, an attorney and his law firm 
in Salt Lake, Utah, sued his former client, Mr. Glover, based upon a review that Mr. 
Glover posted on Yelp.com. The comment in total read: 
Worst ever. Had to fire him after I gave him a cluzncefor well over a year. 
Paid him his $2,500 retainer, then paid him another $2,500 shortly 
after ... and I still owe him another several thousand dollars! ... all for his 
hunt-and-peck filing typing b.s. while he makes me ·watch. I'd be willing to 
wager that he was sitting on it and running the hill up until I produced money 
that she [the petitioner in the divorce case} had not gotten her hands on. She 
admitted that she spent $40k in the safe. My order is_still_based on 
substantial~v higher income earned in the hard way in the Middle East, 
supporting my family by supporting those who protect our freedom. The 
arrears has become astronomical and ORS is threatening lo take my license 
and passport ... Yelled at me once when I called to ask him about something 
his o,fJice had sent me that day. Told me to "GOOGLE JT!" Worst. Ever. 
Filed a Utah Bar complaint strongly considering suing him. Just have to 
find someone to do it. 
Based upon this on line Yelp.com review, Spencer sued Mr. Glover for, relevant to 
6 
this appeal, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional 
interference with economic relations. The Honorable L. Douglas Hogan presided below. 
After filing the complaint, Spencer also sought a Temporary Restraining Order seeking 
immediate judicial intervention to force Mr. Glover remove the review on an expedited 
basis, which Judge Hogan denied. Mr. Glover then moved to dismiss the claims at issue, 
pursuant to UTAH R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).3 
Jn a well-reasoned, thorough opinion, Judge Hogan applied the four factors from 
Hogan v. Winder, No. 2: I 2-cv-123 TS, 20 I 2 WL 4356326 (D. Utah Sept. 24, 2012), 
a.ff'd, 762 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1018) in determining that 
Mr. Glover's Yelp.com review was opinion and did not amount to defamation. As 
Spencer's other tort-based causes of action hinged upon the Yelp.com review being 
defamatory, Judge Hogan dismissed those claims as well with prejudice.4 
3 As discussed below, Spencer also sued Mr. Glover for breach of contract and 
declaratory relief. Judge Hogan dismissed the declaratory relief claim, and Spencer has 
not appealed that determination. Judge Hogan dismissed the breach of contract claim 
without prejudice and ordered the parties to arbitration based upon the engagement letter 
provided to Mr. Glover by Spencer. Spencer has not appealed Judge Hogan's order as to 
the breach of contract c1aim either. 
4 Spencer did not request leave to amend in the court below, and Spencer has not raised 
the issue of leave to amend on appeal. 
7 
On appeal, Spencer claims that the following phrases are defamatory: "Worst 
ever"; "had to fire him"; "all for his hunt-and-peck filing typing B.S. while he makes me 
watch"; "I'd be willing to wager that he was sitting on it an mnning the gill up until I 
produced money"; and "Yelled at me once when l called to ask him about something his 
office had sent me that day. Told me to 'GOOGLE IT!' Worst. Ever." (App. Br., at 17-
19.) In support, however, Spencer does not explain how Judge Hogan's order was wrong 
or inc01Tect. Rather, Spencer relies upon simply restating the Hogan factors in 
conclusory terms without convincing analysis or explanation. 
Judge Hogan's order was correct. The Yelp.com review is opinion, containing 
Mr. Glover's subjective beliefa laced with hyperbole, and therefore does not give rise to a 
defamation claim as a matter of law. Courts nationwide are in accord when facing 
similar online reviews. Because Spencer's other tort-based claims rely upon the 
allegedly defamatory nature of the Yelp.com review, Judge Hogan's order was correct in 
dismissing those claims with prejudice as well. Indeed, Spencer does not dispute that if 
their defamation claim fails as a matter of law, so must their other tort-based claims. 
Respectfolly, this Court should affirm Judge Hogan's order in total. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/ Appellant Terry R. Spencer is an attorney in Utah. (App. Br. at l; see 
also ROOOO 1, at 1 I.) Plaintiff/ Appellant TR Spencer & Associates, P.C. is a "Utah 
corporation under which Mr. Spencer performs legal services for the general public." 
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(App. Br. at 1; see also R00002, at ii 2.) Mr. Glover hired Spencer to represent him in his 
divorce proceedings, Glover v. Glover, Case No. I 34402482, pending in the Fourth 
Judicial District, before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan. (See R00253-00259; R00261-
00270.) 
Over time, Mr. Glover became dissatisfied with Spencer's legal services. For 
example, from March 2014 to, at a minimum, December 2014, there appears to have been 
little to no communication between Spencer and Mr. Glover related to the divorce 
proceedings. (See R00226 (citing R00I 9, at~~ 7-9; R00261-00270.) Therefore, on 
March 18, 2015, Mr. Glover hired a new attorney. (See R0025-R0026 (citing R00258; 
R00022, at ,r 25.) 
On or around April 29, 2015, Mr. Glover posted a review on Yelp.com pertaining 
to Spencer. (R000I 0.) That review stated: 
Worst ever. Had to fire him after I gave him a chance for l-vell over a year. 
Paid him his $2,500 retainer, then paid him another $2,500 shortly after ... 
and I still owe him another several thousand dollars! ... all for his hunt-and-
peckfiling typing b.s. while he makes me watch. I'd be willing to wager that 
he was sitting on it and running the bill up until I produced money that she 
[the petitioner in the divorce case} had not gotten her hands on. She 
admitted that she spent $4Uk in the s{{/e. My order is_still_based on 
substantially higher income earned in the hard ·way in the Middle East, 
supporting my family by supporting those who protect our freedom. The 
arrears has become astronomical and ORS is threatening to take my license 
and passport ... Yelled at me once when I called to ask him about something 
his office had sent ,ne that day. Told me to "GOOGLE IT!" Worst. Ever. 
Filed a Utah Bar complaint strongly considering suing him. Just have to 
find someone to do it. 
(Id.) Yelp.corn "'describes itself generally as an online networking platform that 
9 
connects people with great local businesses, by hosting user-generated reviews." 
(R00227, ,r 13 (citing Cur,y v. Yelp Inc., Case No. 14-cv-03547-JST, 2015 WL 1849037, 
at *l (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015) (citation omitted) (unpublished).) 
Spencer sued Mr. Glover based upon Mr. Glover,s Yelp.com review. (R0000 1-
00009.) In their lawsuit, Spencer sued Mr. Glover for: i) defamation; ii) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; iii) intentional interference with economic relations; iv) 
declaratory relief; and v) breach of contract. (Id.) Spencer also filed a Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order. (R000 13-00121 .) In the Complaint, the only explanation 
provided by Spencer as to the allegedly defamatory nature of the Yelp.com review was: 
(i) "Defendant Glover caused to be published and/or remain published a statement in 
electronic print on an internet website open to the public defamatory statements 
concerning Terry R. Spencer[r (Rooo3, at ,I 11.); and (ii) "Said statement made by 
Defendant Glover are (sic) false, without foundation and are (sic) attempts to impeach 
the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation, (sic) of [Plaintiff] ... and thereby, expose 
[Plaintiffs] ... to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule as well as loss of income. (Roooo3-
00004, at 112 (alterations added).) 
At the hearing on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Judge Hogan 
found, among other things, that Spencer did not have a good likelihood of success on the 
merits. (R00285-00287.) Judge Hogan based his decision primarily upon the Yelp.com 
review amounting to mere opinion. (R00286, at ~ii 15-19.).) Therefore, Judge Hogan 
denied Spencer's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (R00283.) 
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On June 29, 2015, Mr. Glover filed pursuant to UTAH R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6) and UTAH 
ConEANN. § 78B-11-108 a Motion to Dismiss the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Causes 
of Action, and to dismiss and/or stay the remaining breach of contract claim pending 
arbitration. (R00221-00272.)5 On July 13, 2015, Spencer filed an opposition to the 
Motion to Dismiss. (R00342-00368.) In support of the opposition, Spencer also 
submitted four affidavits the same day. (R00328-0034 l.) Over the next two days, 
Spencer also lodged with the Court two more affidavits. (R0037 l-003 78.) Glover filed 
his reply in fmiher support of the Motion to Dismiss on July 17, 2015. (R00394-00407.) 
Judge Hogan heard oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss on September 3, 
2015. (R00461-00512 (Trans.).) Ultimately, Judge Hogan issued a Ruling and Order on 
5 Before Mr. Glover filed his Motion to Dismiss, on June 19, 2015, Spencer served three 
subpoenas, one each on Mr. Glover's ex-wife, her attorney, and Mr. Glover's employer. 
(R00298-00306.) Mr. GJover's response to the Complaint, however, was not yet due and 
therefore discovery was not yet open. Therefore, on July 1, 2015, Mr. Glover attempted 
to meet-and-confer with Spencer regarding the rogue subpoenas. (R00307-00308.) On 
July 6, 2015, Spencer refused to withdraw the subpoenas. (R00315.) Therefore, Mr. 
Glover was forced to file a Statement of Discovery Issues with the court below. 
(R00291-00295.) Spencer did not oppose the Statement of Discovery Issues. (R0038 I.) 
The Court granted the Statement of Discovery Issues, quashed the subpoenas, and stayed 
discovery pending the resolution of Mr. Glover's Motion to Dismiss. (R00391-00392.) 
I I 
September 28, 2015 granting the Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. (R004 l 7-00427.) As 
to the defamation claim, Judge Hogan applied West and Hogan. In doing so, Judge 
Hogan analyzed the following four factors: 
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the 
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the 
full context of the statement-Jo,· example, the entire article or column-in 
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in 
which the statement appears." 
(Roo421 (citing Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at ·*8 (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1018)).) 
To the first factor, Judge Hogan found that "the words 'hunt-and-peck', 'b.s.', 
'yelled', and 'worst ever' are words commonly used to convey one's subjective belief 
about another's ability or behavior." (Id.) He found that "I'd be willing to wager" is 
likewise indicative of subjective belief. (Roo421-00422.) To the second factor, Judge 
Hogan found that "because the words convey a subjective belief, it is not possible ... to 
objectively verify whether the statements are true or false." (Roo422.) 
To the third factor, Judge Hogan found that "[t]he context of the Yelp review also 
shows that the statements were made by a biased, and therefore potentially unreliable, 
individual." (Id.) In reaching that conclusion, Judge Hogan noted that the other 
statements in the comment "make clear that the statements are based in opinion, rather 
than fact." (Id.) Finally, to the fourth factor, Judge Hogan found that "the broad setting 
in which the article appears - a necessarily subjective online review of a particular 
business, published in the review section of a website commonly used by customers to 
rank their experiences with business of all kinds - suggests that the statements are 
opinion." (Id.) As Judge Hogan explained, "[t]he reasonable reader would realize not 
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only that the accusation was made in the heat of a nasty legal dispute but also that the 
'objectionable terms were merely hyperbole and rhetorical flourish."' (Id. (citing Hogan 
v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1108 (10th Cir. 2014).) Indeed, as Judge Hogan cited, 
"during oral argument, even Spencer identified [Mr.] Glover's remarks as 'ranting and 
raving' and the 'beliefs' of one individual." (Id. See also Roo482, at 22:8-15.) In short, 
Judge Hogan found that "the Yelp review is hyperbolic opinion." (Roo422.) 
Because Spencer based their other tort-based claims and declaratory relief on the 
alleged defamatory nature of the Yelp.com review, ,Judge Hogan also dismissed those 
claims. As to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Judge Hogan found 
that "( w ]riting and publishing a critical online review docs not amount to outrageous 
and intolerable behavior, particularly where there is no defamation." (Roo423.) As to 
the intentional interference with economic relations claim, Judge Hogan found that 
"even if [Mr.] Glover intentionally inte1fered ,vith Spencer's prospective economic 
relations, and even if such interference resulted in injury to Spencer, the facts alleged in 
Spencer's pleading do not demonstrate that writing an online review amounts to an 
'improper means'. The court has already determined that the review did not amount to 
defamation, and no other impropriety is apparent." (Roo424.) ,Judge Hogan also 
dismissed Spencer's claim for declaratory relief (icl.), but Spencer has not appealed that 
aspect of the Order. (See generally App. Br.) 
Finally, Judge Hogan dismissed without prejudice Spencer's claim for breach of 
contract. (R.00425-26.) Like the declaratory relief claim, Spencer has not appealed that 
aspect of ,Judge Hogan's Order. (See generally App. Br.) Spencer filed a Notice of 
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Appeal on October 23, 2015. (Roo428-00429.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Hogan, through a well-reasoned and thorough order, reached the correct 
conclusion. Spencer filed a complaint asserting in conclusory fashion that the Yelp.corn 
review was defamatory. While Spencer did not point out which parts of the comment 
were defamatory, Judge Hogan engaged in a detailed analysis of the review, going line-
by-line over every aspect of the review that could potentially be construed as defamatory. 
Judge Hogan also gave proper review to and consideration of the other aspects of the 
review, including the nature of Yelp.com and the review when read as a whole. As to 
each of the allegedly offending portions of the comment -- portions cited by Spencer here 
on appeal - Judge Hogan gave careful consideration of the law and found that the review 
was a hyperbolic comment by a disgruntled former client of Spencer's, thereby making 
the comment mere opinion and not otherwise actionable statements of fact. 
Now with a second chance to explain why the Yelp.com review is defamatory, 
Spencer still has failed to do so. A review of the West factors, as applied by the United 
States District Court, District of Utah, in Hogan shows the Yelp.com review is not 
defamatory. The common usage of the words - including "worst ever", ub.s.", uhunt-
and-peck", "'yelled", and "I'd be willing to wager" - arc words commonly used to convey 
one's subjective belief. Because the words convey subjective belief, it is not possible to 
objectively verify the statements, as Judge Hogan found. The full context of the review 
militates towards the finding that the review is the mere opinion of a dissatisfied former 
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client, as explained in the review. Finally, the broader setting - a comment on Yelp.com, 
a comment aggregator - also leads to the conclusion that the review is mere opinion and 
not defamatory as a matter of law. 
Because Spence(s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
inlentional interference with economic relations rise and fall with the defamation claim, 
which Spencer agrees with, Judge Hogan's order was correct in dismissing those claims 
with prejudice as we11. Respectfully~ this Court should affirm Judge Hogan's order in 
total. 
ARGUMENT 
I. General Law Applicable To Defamation And The First Amendment 
While Judge Hogan's order focused on the West and Hogan factors, as discussed 
below, it is important to note that Spencer's claims against Mr. Glover implicate a wider 
range of law. It bears emphasis that "state defamation law may not permit causes of 
action that impair state or federal constitutional freedom of expression or freedom of the 
press." Dennet v. Smith, 445 P.2d 983, 1004 (Utah 1968). As with the First 
Amendment, the Utah Constitution protects statements of opinion. As the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: "article I, sections I and 15 protect expressions of opinion, and this 
protection is 'abused' when the opinion states or implies facts that are false and 
defamatory. If the opinion does not imply such facts or if the underlying facts are not 
defamatory, an action for defamation is improper." Id. at IO 15. 
federal law is in accord. "Although the Supreme Court has refused to give 
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blanket First Amendment protection for opinions, its precedents make clear that the First 
Amendment does protect 'statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating 
actual facts about an individual."' Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC, 728 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 
2013) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)) (affirming 
dismissal of defamation action based upon statement that hotel was amongst the "dirtiest" 
hotels). "[T]he Supreme Court [has] reaffirmed ... [the proposition] that ... statements 
employing 'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression 
that the writer was seriously maintaining' an assertion of fact[]" are protected speech. Id. 
(citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20-21 ). 
II. Judge Hogan Was Correct In Finding The Yelp.com 
Review Is Mere Opinion And Not Dcfamatorv 
In analyzing Spencer's defamation claim, Judge Hogan correctly cited and applied 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 
1994). (R004 I 9-00420.) As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]o state a claim for 
defamation, [plaintiff] must shovv that defendant[] published the statements concerning 
[plaintiff], that the statements were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, 
that the statements were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their 
publication resulted in damage." West, 872 P.2d at 1008-09. As he was reviewing the 
Complaint on a motion to dismiss, Judge Hogan "accept[ed] that the statements were 
false and that they resulted in damage to Spencer." (Roo420.) 
Therefore, Judge Hogan's review was narrowed down to "'whether the statements 
are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning and whether any qualified or absolute 
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privileges preclude [Spencer's] claim."' (Id. (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1008) (alteration 
in original).) While Spencer did not explain in their Complaint what aspects of the 
Yelp.com review were allegedly defamatory, 6 Judge Hogan identified "the potentially 
objectionable statements[,]" which are: "1. 'all for his hunt-and-peck filing typing b.s. 
while he makes me ,vatch []; 2. 'I'd be willing to wager that he was sitting on it and 
running the bill up until I produced money[]; and :3. 'Yelled at me once when I called to 
ask him about something his office had sent me that day. Told me to 'GOOGLE IT!' 
Worst. Ever." (Roo421 (citing R.000010).) 
Judge Hogan then proceeded to determine whether those statements amounted to 
defamation. As Judge Hogan cited, "to determine whether a statement is fact or opinion, 
the Court considers the following four factors: 
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the 
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the 
full context of the stlltement-for example, the entire article or column-in 
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in 
which the statement appears. 
6 Spencer bore the burden of explaining in their Complaint which aspects of the 
Yelp.com review were alleged I y defamatory. "It is almost axiomatic that in defamation 
cases a certain degree of specificity is an essential in pleadings, that the language 
complained of must be set forth in words or words to that effect and that the defendant 
should not be required to resort to the ofttimes expensive discovery process to drag from 
a litigant what he really intends to do to his adversary by a vehicle shrouded in mystery." 
Dennet, 445 P .2d at 984. 
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(Roo42l (citing Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at *8 (citing West, 872 P.2d at 1018)).) 
Judge Hogan then proceed to analyze each of the Hpotenlially objectionable 
statements" under the Hogan and West framework. As Judge Hogan cotTectly found, 
each of the four factors show that the Yelp.com review is opinion, does not include 
statements of fact, and therefore does not amount to defamation as a matter of law. 
A. The Common Usage Of The Words In The 
Yelp.com Review Is To Express Opinion 
"Whether a statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a 
question oflaw[.]" West, 872 P.2cl at 1008 (citations omitted). "'[I]n determining 
whether a particular statement fits within the rather broad definition of what may be 
considered defamatory, the guiding principle is the statement's tendency to injure a 
reputation in the eyes of its audience."' Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at *7 (citing West, 
872 P.2d at 1008) (alteration in original). That being said, "'[b]ecause expressions of 
pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas and because such expressions are incapable 
of being verified, they cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability."' Id. (citing 
West, 872 P.2d at 1015) (alteration in original). 
As Judge Hogan found, "the words 'hunt-and-peck', 'b.s.', 'yelled', and 'worst 
ever' are words commonly used to convey one's subjective belief about another's ability 
or behavior." (R00421.) And this finding is correct. The common usage of these words 
are "used to convey one's subjective belief about another's ability or behavior." Hogan, 
2012 WL 4356326, at *8 ("performance" and "erratic" are statements of opinion). See 
also West, 872 P.2d at I 008-09 (while "statement [ of manipulation] is critical of West, 
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we do not believe it rises to the level of defamation."); Brampton Bldg, LLC, 2013 IL 
App (JS') 120547-U, 2013 WL 416185, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 31, 2013) (unpublished) 
("This is a TOT AL lie!!!" and statements of "illegally charging late fees" arc statements 
of opinion based on, among other things, context). Moreover, with the statements being 
in a Y clp.com review, the context also shows that the comments are opinion. Hogan, 
2012 WL 4356326, at *8; West, 872 P.2d at 1009; Brompton Bldg., LLC, 2013 WL 
416185, at *7. Indeed, like the editorial in West, the comments here were "made in a 
casual, albeit critical, tone.'' 872 P.2d at IO I 0. And, as the West court found, "[i]t is 
unlikely that any reader would take lthe commcntsJ at face value; instead, most readers 
would view [the comments] as exaggerated commentary expressing [Mr. Glover's] 
frustration in dealing with [Spencer]." Id. 
Spencer does not directly refute that the common usage of "hunt-and-peck", 
"b.s.", and "yelled" convey subjective belief. (See App. Br. at I 7-18.) Spencer, 
however, claims that the statement "worse ever" is "clearly false and defamatory[.]" (Id. 
at 18.) Spencer, however, docs not explain how "'worse ever" or "worst ever" - both 
superlatives - in their common usage are anything other than hyperbole and one's 
subjective belief. Likewise, while Spencer takes issue with the statement "had to fire 
him" and "I gave him a chance for well over a year" (id at 18.), Spencer fails to explain 
how these words do not convey anything but Mr. Glover's subjective belief or 
interpretation of what happened. Indeed, Spencer says that Mr. Glover used these words 
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to "suggest" or "give the clear impression", both of which show that even in Spencer's 
mind, the words convey Mr. Glover's subjective belief. See Seaton, 728 F.3d at 598 
(affirming dismissal of defamation claim because, among other things, 'HDirtiest' is a 
loose, hyperbolic term because it is the superlative of an adjective that conveys an 
inherently su/~jective concept'' (emphasis added)). 
B. The Potentially Obiectionable Statements Are 
Not Capable Of Being Obiectivcly Verified 
To the second West/Hogan factor, Judge Hogan found that "because the words 
convey a subjective belief, it is not possible ... to objectively verify whether the 
statements are true or false." (R.00422.) This is the exact language from the Hogan 
opinion. See lfogan, 2012 WL 4356356, at *8. Moreover, as Mr. Glover explained in 
his reply in further support of his Motion to Dismiss, as a matter of logic, how would one 
prove that a lawyer is the "Worst. Ever."? Such a statement is unquantifiable and 
unprovable. One would theoretically have to poll a large sample of Salt Lake or Utah, 
and ask those individuals questions about the thousands of attorneys here to try to 
determine who is the worst. 7 More importantly, the polling would necessarily have to ask 
'"what is your opinion as to attorney X?" in order to determine who is Hworst." See 
Seaton, 728 F.3d at 598. 
7 And might even have to include retired, disbarred, and deceased attorneys to cover the 
"Ever" aspect of the comment. 
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A similar analysis applies to "had to fire him" and "I gave him a chance for well 
over a year." Utah law is clear that it is solely the client's prerogative as to whether keep 
or terminate an attorney/client relationship. "A client has a right to discharge a lawyer at 
any time, with or without cause[.]" UTAH. R. PROF'L C. 1.16, comment 4 (emphasis 
added). If the client feels that he gave his attorney "'well over a year" lo prove himself 
and the client is dissatisfied, then it is solely the cl ie::nt 's decision as to whether he "had to 
fire" his attorney or not. Put simply, and as supported by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, that decision is solely the subjective choice of the client. 
Spencer claims that because he has never been disciplined by the Utah State Bar 
and that he has over 25 years of experience, he simply cannot be the "worst ever" 
attorney in Utah. (App. Br. at 18, n.4.)8 The argument misses the mark. The superlative 
8 While Spencer cites never having been sanctioned by the Utah State Bar, the 
Professional Conduct Board of the Idaho State Bar issued a public reprimand against 
Terry R. Spencer based on professional misconduct. See The Advocate, Official 
Publication of the Idaho State Bar, Vo. 52 No. I, Jan. 2009, at 10 (available at 
http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocatc/issucs/adv09jan.pdf (last visited June 2, 2016)). 
Furthermore, there is at least one case where Spencer was sanctioned by a court. See Seal 
v. Young, No. 2: 10-cv-790 TS, 2012 WL 177544 (D. Utah Jan. 20, 2012) (unpublished) 
("ORDERED that Plaintiffs counsel, Terry R. Spencer, shall pay attorney fees, in the 
amount of six thousand, one hundred and twenty dollars ($6,120.00), to Defendants."). 
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nature of ''worst ever", akin to the superlative "dirtiest'\ is one~s own subjective belief. 
See Seaton, 728 F.3d at 598. Again, one would be hard-pressed to come up with a 
workable metric by which to objectively determine who is, in fact, the worst attorney in 
Utah. 
Likewise, Spencer asserts that "yelled at me" is somehow subject to objective 
verification. (App. Br. at 19.) The statement is illogical and cannot withstand scrutiny. 
A high-pitched shrill may be entirely unobjectionable to a person with diminished 
hearing, while a church mouse's footsteps could be uncomfortable to someone with 
supersonic hearing. In other words, whether a person's communication amounts to 
"yelling" is simply in the ear of the listener. Finally, Spencer submits that "astronomical 
arrearage" is also subject to objective verification. (App. 13r. at 19.) Like Spencer's 
others arguments, this assertion proverbially falls a few dollars short. The deepest 
pockets in the world - such as Warren Buffet - may find that Mr. Glover's arrearage 
balance amounted to mere pennies in the grand scheme. But someone living at or near 
the poverty line would be crushed by even a few hundred dollars in arrearagcs. Whether 
an arrearage amount is ''astronomical" depends upon the balance sheet of the debtor. 9 
C. The Full Yelp.com Review Shows That It Is Mere Opinion 
As Judge Hogan explained, ··[t]he context of the Yelp review also shows that the 
9 Spencer does not challenge that "hunt-and-peck" and "running up the bill" are not 
subject to objective verification. (App. Br. at 19.) 
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statements were made by a biased, and therefore potentially unreliable, individual." 
(R00422.) In reviewing the Yelp.com review in its entirety, Judge Hogan high I ighted 
that "[t]he review communicates that [Mr.] Glover was in the midst of an acrimonious 
divorce, that he had fired Spencer, that he sti1I owed Spencer several thousand dollars, 
that [Mr.] Glover faced ·astronomical' support arrears, and that the Office of Recovery 
Services was threatening to take Glover's 'license and passport."' (Id.) In reviewing the 
entirety of the Yelp.com review, Judge Hogan found that "it appears clear that the context 
of the statements, that is, the full review, makes clear that the statements are based in 
opinion, rather than fact." (/d.) Judge Hogan was correct. 
Aside from what Judge Hogan highlighted, other portions of the Yelp.com review 
show that Mr. Glover was expressing his opinion. For example, ''I'd be willing to wager" 
evidences a former client expressing his opinion and dissatisfaction with his former 
attorney. Bro mp ton Bldg, LLC, 2013 WL 416185, at 'l."7 (While "rhetorical hyperbole ... 
[in] a review on a website where people search for information regarding local 
business ... appears to signal factual content[,] ... review[ing] [the comment] in its 
entirety [appears to show it is] in the nature of opinions, not statements of fact."). See 
also Hogan, 2012 WL 4356326, at •x•s; West, 872 P .2d at 1009. 
Spencer asserts that Judge Hogan "improperly took ... these additional facts" 
highlighted by Judge Hogan - which Spencer calls "mental-health-related facts or 
claims" - into consideration. (App. Br. at 20.) But Spencer's argument is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the West/ Hogan third factor. The question is whether the entirety 
of the comment suggests that the speaker is conveying facts or whether the speaker is 
') ..... 
_., 
conveying mere opinion. Therefore, Judge Hogan properly and correctly considered the 
Yelp.com review in its entirety when reaching his decision. 
While Spencer's argument misses the mark in regards to the third factor, it bears 
emphasis that Spencer's entire argument as to the third factor is based upon Spencer 
challenging his former client's mental state. Spencer states that Mr. Glover has 
"questionable mental health", that Mr. Glover has a "diminished state of mind", and that 
Mr. Glover is "mentally ill." (App. Br. at 20-21, 23.) Mr. Glover takes issue with 
Spencer's characterization. While Spencer and Mr. Glover are engaged in litigation 
related to Spencer's representation of Mr. Glover, the simple fact is that Spencer is still, 
nonetheless, Mr. Glover's former attorney. Regardless of how upset an attorney is with a 
fom1er client, an attorney should not characterize -- before a court of this state or 
othe1wisc - his former client as having mental health issues unless the issue is relevant, 
such as in competency proceedings during criminal cases. Ironically, Sptmcer stating in 
his brief that Mr. Glover is 44111Cntally il1" is itself potentially defamatory. 
D. rfhe Broader Setting Of The Review Published On 
Yelp.com Shows The Review Is Mere Opinion 
Finally, Judge Hogan properly concluded that "the broader setting in which the 
article appears - a necessarily subjective online revit!w of a particular business, published 
in the review section of a website commonly used by customers to rank their experiences 
with businesses of all kinds - suggests that the statements are opinion." (R00422.) As 
Judge Hogan explained, "[t]he reasonable reader would realize not only that the 
accusation was made in the heat of a nasty legal dispute but also that 'the objectionable 
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terms were merely hyperbole and rhetorical flourish.'" (Id. (citing Hogan v. Winder, 762 
F.3d at 1108.) 
As Mr. Glover explained in the court below, West is instructive on this point. 
There, the court stressed that the allegedly defamatory comment was "in a newspaper 
editorial, a traditional source of harsh political invective." West, 872 P.2d at 1009. 
Here, the comments were on Yelp.com, an online aggregalor of public comments about 
local establishments. If a person gives a "one star" review, accompanied by a negative 
comment, like the readers of a newspaper editorial column, the readers of those 
comments are "less likely to form personal animus toward an individual based on 
statements made in" the Yelp.com reviews section. Id. at 1010. 
To this point, during oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Hogan 
asked Spencer "that if [someone] posted a 1 star or a 1 on a scale of 1 to 10 or a o and 
nothing further ... under the position you've advocated, that's actionable defamation." 
(Roo491, at 31:8-16.) Spencer responded that it would not be defamation "because how 
do you prove a star is true or false?" (Id. at 31:20-23.) Spencer's concession should 
resolve this dispute. Be it a star or a comment with superlatives and hyperbolic 
language, the conclusion reached from Judge Hogan's rationale - and Spencer's 
concession thereto - is the same. The overall context of the Yelp.com review at issue 
here suggests that the comment is opinion: akin to a 1-star rating. See Loftus v. Nazar( 
21 F.Supp.3d 849, 854 (E.D. Ky. 2014) ("Further, it must be taken into account that the 
statements by Ms. Nazari were posted on opinion websites; therefore, the natural 
tendency would be to infer that they are opinion."). 
25 
Spencer's only argument in regards to the fourth West/ Hogan factor is that "the 
comment should be seen through the eyes of those who read the comment, not the 
person who authored the comment." (App. Br. at 22.) A review of Judge Hogan's order, 
however, shows that is exactly what Judge Hogan did. And Spencer's own argument -
noting that Mr. Glover's remarks were "ranting and raving'' and the "beliefs" of one 
individual - shows that even Spencer, a reader himself of the Yelp.com review, saw the 
comment as mere opinion. (See Roo436.) 
Overall, Judge Hogan was correct in noting "that any review which is either 
emphatically positive or emphatically negative is hyperbole.'' (R00422.) Therefore, Mr. 
Glover respectfully submits that this Court should affirm Judge Hogan's order dismissing 
Spencer's defamation claim with prejudice. 
III. The Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress Claim Fails Because 
The Yelp.com Review \Vas Not Defamatory And Otherwise Does Not 
Rise To The Level Of Extreme Or Outrageous Conduct 
Judge Hogan properly found that"[ w ]riting and publishing a critical on line review 
does not amount to outrageous and intolerable behavior, particularly where there is no 
defamation." (R.00437.) Spencer's only argument in response is lo double-down on his 
assertion that the Yelp.com review was defamatory. (App. Br. at 25.) Therefore, if this 
Court affirms Judge Hogan's order as to the defamation claim, it must therefore affirm 
the order as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as well. 
Even if the review was defamatory - which, as Judge Hogan found and as detailed 
above, it was not - the mere posting or a review on Yelp.com cannot be said lo be 
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"outrageous and intolerable in that [it] offend[s] against the generally accepted standards 
of decency and morality." Bennet, 2003 UT 9, ,1 58. Indeed, aside from the allegedly 
defamatory nature of the review, Spencer provides no explanation in his Complaint or his 
brief as to how Mr. Glover's conduct was outrageous or intolerable. (See generally 
R0000l-R0O0l 0; App. Br. at 23-25.) 
IV. The Intentional .Interference With Economic Relations 
Claim Fails Because Mr. Glover's Yelp.com Review 
Docs Not Amount To Improper Means 
Judge Hogan also properly dismissed the intentional interference with economic 
relations claim. As Judge Hogan explained, in applying Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 
21, 345 P.3d 553, "even if [Mr.] glover intentionally interfered with Spencer's 
prospective economic relations, and even if such interference resulted in injury to 
Spencer, the facts alleged in Spencer's pleading do not demonstrate that writing an online 
review amounts to an 'improper means'." (R00438.) See Loftus, 21 F.Supp.3d at 854 
("where an action for interference with prospective business relationship relies on a 
defamatory posting as the instrument of such interference, the prospective relationship 
count fails if the posting was protected opinion" (citation omitted).) 
Spencer's only argument is again to reassert that the Yelp.com review was 
defamatory, and therefore the intentional interference claim should not have been 
dismissed. (App. Br. 26.) As Judge Hogan noted, "no other impropriety is apparent" in 
Spencer's Complaint. (Roo438.) Because the Yelp.com review is not defamatory, 
Spencer's claim for intentional interference with economic relations necessarily fails as 
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well. 
V. Judge Hogan Properly Treated Mr. Glover's 
Motion As A Motion To Dismiss 
Spencer did not directly raise the issue of Judge Hogan's decision to not consider 
the affidavits submitted by Spencer with their opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (See 
App. Br. 1-2.) Therefore, Spencer has not properly preserved the issue on appeal. See, 
e.g., Allen, 2008 UT at 1 8. Spencer, however, references the six affidavits he filed with 
the cou1i below. (See App. Br. at 12-13, ~132-34.) Spencer also relics upon the 
affidavits in addressing the "full context" prong of the West/Hogan analysis. (See App. 
Br. at 21, 1 16.) Therefore, out of an abundance of caution and in order to be thorough, 
Mr. Glover is addressing Judge Hogan's decision to not consider the affidavits filed by 
Spencer. 
"If a court docs not exclude material outside the pleadings and fails to convert a 
rule 12(b )(6) motion to one for summary judgment, it is reversible error unless the 
dismissal can be justified without considering the outside documents." Oakwood Village, 
LLC, 2004 UT IO 1, 1 12 ( citation omitted). There are two exceptions, however. "First, if 
'a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but 
the document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim, a 
defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a 
motion to dismiss.'" Id. at 1 13 ( citation omitted). Second, "the submission of 
documents outside the pleadings by itself is not a basis for conversion to summary 
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judgment; to effect a rule l 2(b) conversion, the court must have relied on those 
documents for its decision." Id. at il 14 ( citation omitted). 
In their brief, Spencer docs no articulate their position as to why Judge Hogan 
should have considered the affidavits filed in support of their opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss. In the court below, however, Spencer argued that because Mr. Glover 
submitted certain documents to the court, "this matter is to be treated ... as a 'Motion for 
Summary Judgment' and will be treated as such by Plaintiffs[.]" (R00343.) Spencer's 
argument below was wrong. The documents submitted by Mr. Glover were: (i) the 
engagement letter entered into between Spencer and Mr. Glover (R00264-00270); (ii) a 
scrcenshot from Spencer's onlinc blog (R0024 I -0025 I); and (iii) a copy of the docket 
from Mr. Glover's divorce case (R00253-00259). As to the online blog, Mr. Glover 
specifically stated that he was not requesting that the court take judicial notice of the 
blog; he was "merely providing th[ e] information as background." (R00225.) As to the 
other documents, Mr. Glover requested that the court take judicial notice of those 
documents. (See R00227.) 
Judge Hogan did not con.sider any evidence outside of the pleadings when 
rendering his decision on the Molion to Dismiss, .save for the engagement letter entered 
into by Spencer and Mr. Glover and the Yelp.com review at issue. (R00433.) As to the 
review, Judge I Iogan properly found that Spencer had "attached a copy of the relevant 
publication to his complaint[.]" subjecting the Yelp.com review to consideration on a 
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motion to dismiss. (Id. (citing Oakwood Vil!. LLC, 2004 UT J 01, if I 3).) As to the 
engagement letter, .Judge Hogan found that Mr. ''Glover ... submitted an indisputably 
authentic copy of that document to be considered on the motion to dismiss." (Id.) 
Because Spencer based their breach of contract claim on the engagement letter, the 
engagement letter was properly the subject of judicial notice. Alvarado v. KOBTV, LLC, 
493 F.3d 1210, 1215 ( I 0th Cir. 2007) ("[N]otwithstanding the usual rule that a court 
should consider no evidence beyond the pleadings on a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion to dismiss, 
' [ a] district court may consider documents referred to in the complaint if the documents 
are central to the plaintiffs claim and the parties do not dispute the documents' 
authenticity."'); see also GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 
1381, 1385 (10th Cir. 1997) (same). 10 Importantly, Judge Hogan then stated that "[a]ll 
other proffered matters outside the pleadings are hereby excluded by the court pursuant to 
UTAH R. Clv. P. I 2(b)." 
VI. Request To Seal Portions Of The Record On Appeal 
In support of their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed in the court 
below, Spencer included several attorney/client communications. (See R00026; R00028; 
R00030; R00041; R00045; R00047~ R00050; R00052; R00060; R00075; R00079-0008 l; 
10 Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App 389, ii 34 n.11, 265 P.3d 139 C"'[t]o the extent Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure arc similarly worded to the Federal Rules, federal rules and 
cases may be used to interpret them."' (citation omitted; alteration in original)). 
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R00085-00089; R00093-00097; R00I00; R00108.) In the Court below, Mr. Glover 
requested that the case record be scaled as to prevent further dissemination of these 
potentially protected and confidential records. (See Addendum, at ROOS I 6.) Spencer 
would not stipulate, and filed a "Notice of Lodging" which included documents upon 
which Spencer apparently rclic<l in submilling the attorney/client communications in the 
open record. (See R00 164-00177.) Spencer claimed that even if the attorney takes the 
offensive and files a lawsuit against his client, "the attorney-client privilege is implicitly 
waived if the attorney needs to defend him or herself." (R00500, at 40:6-9.) 
Over Spencer's objection, Judge Hogan ordered the record sealed based upon 
Spencer's submission of the potentially protectable, rnnfidential communications. (See 
Addendum, at ROOS 16.) Now, further compounding the issue, Spencer has filed the 
appellate record before this Court not under seal. Therefore, Mr. Glover respectfully 
requests that the Court seal the following portions of the record: R00026; R00028; 
R00030; R0004 l; R00045; R00047; R00050; R00052; R00060; R00075; R00079-0008 l; 
R00085-00089; R00093-00097; R00I00; R00I08. See UTAH R. APP. P. 21(g); UTAH 
CODE JUD. ADMIN. R. 4-202.02(3 )(I). Specifically, Mr. Glover does not want the entire 
case scaled. This case is of public importance. But the attorney/client communications 
should not be available to the public. 
CONCLUSION 
In a detailed order, Judge Hogan properly and correctly analyzed Mr. Glover's 
31 
Yelp.com review and found thal the review did nol amount to defamation. Spencer's 
arguments on appeal give no reason to disagree with Judge Hogan's well-reasoned order. 
The simple fact is that the Yelp.com review is hyperbole, laced with superlatives, and 
amounts to nothing more than opinion. The freedom of expression is a bedrock principle 
in the state of Utah and the nation as a whole. Allowing an attorney to sue his former 
client based purely on a negative online review wherein the client expresses his opinion 
as to the attorney would unduly chill the freedom of expression. More importantly, the 
free exchange of information online, including former clients' opinions, assists 
individuals when selecting an attorney to represent them. Judge Hogan's order was 
c01Tect. And Mr. Glover respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the order in 
total. 
UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(l1) STATEMENT 
Included herewith is a copy of the docket from the trial court below. The 
numbering continues the Court's numbering of the record on appeal. Specifically, the 
docket bears the record numbers R.00513-00521. 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO UTAH R. APP. P. 24(t)(l)(A) 
By signing below, the signor certifies that Defendant/ Appellee Stephen M. 
Glover's opposition brief complies with UTAH R. APP. P. 24(t)( I )(A). The typeface is 
13-point font, Times New Roman. The Microsoft Word "word count" tool indicates that 
the brief has 687 lincs comprised of8,428 words, inclusive of the UTAH R. APP. P. 
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@ 
24(a)(l 1) and 24(f)(l)(A) compliance statements. 
DA TED this 8th day of June, 2016. 
THE SALT LAKE LAWYERS 
..,,....--;...,:, ~ -:·# ~---· 
/4
,,,-- 7-(7" L ,,,---_____ , 7~-----•~ :~ 
~t B. Cum;~i:gs -
Attorneys/or Defendant/Appellee Stephen M. 
Glover 
@ 
@ 
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TERRY R. SPENCER, et al., 
Plaintiffs/ Appel ]ants, 
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STEPHEN M. GLOVER, 
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---0000000---
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Appellate Case No. 20150892-CA 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE - ADDENDUM 
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, !:, .. pencer, et al., v. Glover, Case No. 
150903279, Honorable L. Douglas Hogan, Presiding 
GA VIN G. COLLIER 
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D. 
TR Spencer & Associates, P.C. 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Attorneys.fiJr Plaintiff/Appellant 
ROBERT 8. CUMMINGS (SBN 13186) 
THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS 
IO Exchange Place, Suite 622 
Salt Lake City, UT 8411 I 
Telephone: (801) 590-7555 
Facsimile: (801) 384-0825 
E-mai I: ,r~JJ.?crt«i~thcsal tlakelawycrs.com 
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i) 
i) 
i) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
APPEALED: CASE #20150892 
TERRY R SPENCER vs. STEPHEN M GLOVER 
CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - TERRY R SPENCER 
Represented by: GAVIN V COLLIER 
Plaintiff - TR SPENCER & ASSOCIATES PC 
Represented by: GAVIN V COLLIER 
Defendant - STEPHEN M GLOVER 
Represented by: ROBERT B CUMMINGS 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 597.66 
Amount Paid: 597.66 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT s 
Amount Due: 360.00 
Amount Paid: 360.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
Amount Paid: 10.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: POSTAGE-COPIES 
Amount Due: 2.66 
Amount Paid: 2.66 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Ba.lance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 225.00 
Amount Paid: 225.00 
Printed: 06/06/16 16:10:37 Page 1 
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous 
Amount Credit: 
PROCEEDINGS 
05-15-15 Filed: Complaint 
05-15-15 Case filed 
Balance: 
05-15-15 Fee Account created Total Due: 
0.00 
0.00 
05-15-15 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
05-15-15 Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN assigned. 
05-15-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
360.00 
360.00 
05-15-15 Filed: Motion for Temporary Order Restrainting Order Pending 
Hearing 
Filed by: TR SPENCER & ASSOCIATES PC, 
05-15-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
05-15-15 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion For Temporary 
Restraining Order Pending Hearing 
05-15-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration In Support of Temporary 
Restraining Order 
05-15-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-01-15 Filed: 
06-01-15 Filed: 
06-02-15 Filed: 
06-02-15 Filed: 
06-02-15 Filed: 
06-02-15 Filed: 
06-02-15 Note: 
Notice to Submit 
Return of Electronic Notification 
Order (Proposed) Granting Temporary Restraining Order 
Return of Electronic Notification 
Plaintiffs Initial Disclosures 
Return of Electronic Notification 
JA contacted Mr. Collier's office to provide court date 
and instructed legal assistanct that Mr. Collier is to 
notify opposing party of the court date. 
06-02-15 TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER scheduled on June 08, 2015 at 03:00 PM in 
WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge HOGAN. 
06-03-15 Filed: Notice of Hearing 
06-03-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-04-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon STEPHEN M. GLOVER for 
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 27, 2015 
06-04-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-08-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for Temp Restrain Order 
Judge: L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous 
@ 06-16-15 Filed: Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed) Granting 
(!) 
@ 
@) 
@ 
@ 
Temporary Restraining Order 
06-16-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-17-15 
06-17-15 
06-17-15 
06-17-15 
06-19-15 
06-19-15 
06-19-15 
06-19-15 
06-25-15 
06-25-15 
06-26-15 
06-26-15 
Filed: Notice of Intent To Seek Records 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Notice of Lodging - Rule 510 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Records Only) 
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Records Only) 
Filed: Subpoena Duces Tecum (Records Only) 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX 
PARTE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Filed: Order (Proposed) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE 
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
06-26-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-29-15 Note: Submitted Efiled Order to Judge 
06-29-15 Filed: Objection to Notice To Submit 
06-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-29-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon COURTNEY RECORD for 
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 22, 2015 
06-29-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon MELISSA DIXON for 
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 22, 2015 
06-29-15 Filed return: Return of Service upon MELISSA DIXON for 
Party Served: STEPHEN M GLOVER 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: June 22, 2015 
06-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-29-15 Filed: Motion DEFENDANT STEPHEN M. GLOVERS MOTION TO: 1) 
DISMISS THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION; 
AND 2) TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY THE REMAINING CLAIMS PENDING 
ARBITRATION OF THE FIFTH COA 
Filed by: GLOVER, STEPHEN M 
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CASE NUMBER 150903?79 Miscellaneous 
06-29-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Stephen M. Glover ISO Motion to 
Dismiss/Stay 
06-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
06-29-15 Filed: Opposition to ObjecL.i.on to Notice to Submit 
06-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-02-15 Fee Account created 
07-02-15 Fee Account created 
07-02-15 AUDIO TAPE COPY 
07-02-15 POSTAGE-COPIES 
Total 
Tolal 
Payment 
Payment 
Due: 10.00 
Due: 2.66 
Received: 
Received: 
07-02-15 Filed: Request for Recording - Robert B. Cummings 
07-02-15 Note: Requested CD completed and placed in the mail. 
10.00 
2.66 
07-06-15 Filed order: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE MOTION FOR 
07-06-JS 
07-07-15 
07-07-15 
07-07-15 
07-0'/-15 
07-07-15 
07-07-15 
07-07-15 
07-07-15 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
Signed July 0 6, 2015 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Pursuant 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues I::xhibit 
Filed: Statement o: Discovery Issues Exhibit 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit 
Filed: Statement of Discovery Issues Exhibit 
to Rule 37(a) 
l\ 
B 
C 
L) 
E 
F 
G 
07-07-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Quashing Subpoenas and Staying 
Discovery Pending Resolution of Defendants Motion to Dismiss 
07-07-15 Filed: Return of ElecLronic Notification 
07-08-15 Filed: Other - Declined to Sign Order (Proposed} Quashing 
Subpoenas and Staying Discovery Pending Resolution of 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss 
07-08-15 Note: A Request to Submit is required according to Rule 7 
(civil) or Rule 26 (criminal). Court will not hold 
Proposed Orders. Please refile order. 
07-08-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-13-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Phil Willson (In Opposition to 
Defendant GJovers Motion F'or Surr.mary Judgment} 
07-13-15 Filed: Affidav:i.t/Declarat.i.on Of Jeff Rifleman, Esq. (In 
Opposition Lo Defendant Glovers Motion for Summary Judgment) 
07-13-15 Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Ryan Mills (In Opposition to 
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous 
07-13-15 
07-13-15 
07-13-15 
07-13-15 
07-14-15 
07-14-15 
07-15-15 
07-15-15 
07-16-15 
Defendant Glovers Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Terry R. Spencer (In opposition 
to Defendant Glovers motion for summary judgment} 
Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant Rule 12(b} (6} Motion to Dismiss 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Randy Harrison (In opposition 
to Defendant Glovers motion for summary judgment) 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Affidavit/Declaration of Dan Thomas (in opposition to 
Defendant Glovers Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Stephen Glovers Rule 37(a) 
Statement of Discovery Issues 
07-16-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-16-15 Note: NTS placed in Judge's box for review 
07-16-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENAS AND STAYING 
DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
07-16-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
07-17-15 Filed order: ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENAS AND STAYING DISCOVERY 
PENDING RESOLUTION OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
Signed July 17, 2015 
07-17-15 Filed: Reply IFSO DEFENDANT STEPHEN M. GLOVERS MOTION TO: 1) 
DISMISS THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION; 
AND 2) TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY THE REMAINING CLAIMS PENDING 
ARBITRATION OF THE FIFTH COA 
@ 07-17-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit DEFENDANT STEPHEN M. GLOVERS 
MOTION TO: 1) DISMISS THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, AND FOURTH 
CAUSES OF ACTION; AND 2) TO DISMISS AND/OR STAY THE REMAINING 
CLAIMS PENDING ARBITRATION OF THE FIFTH COA 
07-17-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
@) 07-20-15 Note: NTS on Mot to Dismiss placed in Judge's box for review 
08-06-15 Filed: Notice to Submit (And Request for Hearing) 
08-06-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
08-07-15 Note: Submitted Notice to Submit & Request for Hearing to 
Judge's Team 
@ 
08-14-15 1 HR MOTION HEARING scheduled on September 03, 2015 at 09:00 AM 
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous 
in WJ Courtroom 31 with Judge HOGAN. 
08-14-15 Notice - NOTICE for Case 150903279 ID 16870027 
1 HR MOTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 09/03/2015 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: WJ Courtroom 31 
8080 South Redwood Road 
Suite 1701 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Before Judge: L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
08-14-15 Filed: Notice for Case 150903279 ID 16870027 
09-03-15 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING 
Judge: L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
Clerk: salomet 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): TERRY R SPENCER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT B CUMMINGS 
Audio 
Counsel present before the court for this Motion Hearing. 
09:17 Robert Cummings argued the Motion to dismiss. 
09: 29 Terry Spencer argued before the court. 
10:02 Robert Cummings response. 
The Court will take this matter under advisement at this time. 
end time 10:09 
09-28-15 Filed order: Ruling and Order; Deft's Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED; P's tor claims are dismissed w/prejudice; Parties are 
ordered to arbitration regarding P's claim for breach of 
contract & claim is dismissed w/o prejudice 
Judge L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
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CASE NUMBER 150903279 Miscellaneous 
Signed September 28, 2015 
09-28-15 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice 
Disposition Judge is L DOUGLAS HOGAN 
10-23-15 Filed: Notice of Appeal - Civil (not Interlocutory) 
10-23-15 Fee Account created Total Due: 225.00 
10-23-15 APPEAL Payment Received: 2?5.00 
10-23-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
10-27-15 Filed: Notice of Transcript Request 
10-27-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
@ 10-28-15 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Letter dated 10-28-2015 to Counsel 
- (Appeal filed - Case 4t20150892 should be indicated on future 
filings - rules-info etal) 
10-28-15 Filed: Supreme Court of Utah Order dated 10-28-2015 - (Pursuant 
to rule 42(a) AND Checklist for Appellate Jurisdiction) 
@ 10-28-15 Filed: Notice of Appeal Bond Posting 
@ 
@ 
10-28-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
11-16-15 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals Letter dated 11-16-2015 to Counsel 
- (Case assigned to COA - Case# remain the same) 
12-15-15 Filed: TRANSCRIPT for Hearing of 09-03-2015 
12-18-15 Filed: Received Transcript of Motion to Dismiss dated 9/3/2015 
03-30-16 Note: Appealed: Case #20150892 
03-30-16 Filed: Clerk's Certificate (Judgment Roll & Index) 
03-30-16 Note: File and transcript uploaded electronically to COA -
Exhibits - 0, ca 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRlEF OF 
APPELLEE was filed with the Court of Appeals via personal filing. I further certify that 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via U.S. Mail to: 
GAVIN G. COLLIER 
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D. 
T.R. Spencer & Associates 
140 West 9000 South, Ste. 9 
Sandy, U~h 84070 
DATED this 8th day of June, 2016 
THE SALT LAKE LA WYERS 
Robert B. Cummings 

